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Ning Wang, Making a Market
Economy; Yan Sun, Corruption and
Market in Contemporary China
Gilles Guiheux
1 These two works shed light on the conditions under which, in the course of the last 25
years, the command economy has been dismantled and gradually replaced by a market
system in China . Yan Sun, a professor of political science, is interested in corruption
from a double perspective, both at the macro and the micro level. Ning Wang, a neo-
institutionalist economist, asks how, thanks to the reforms, a region (Jingzhou, south of
Hubei ) has been converted to pisciculture.
2 Corruption is a crucial question, since it threatens both social stability – it has direct
consequences for the distribution of wealth – and the legitimacy of political power – it
provokes popular discontent. Yan Sun’s work sets out a broad panorama of corrupt
practices that have been employed since 1978, understood in the (restricted) sense to
which  the  Chinese  judicial  apparatus  extends,  that  is  to  say  “the  abuses  of  power
committed by officials of the State and of the Party to the benefit of private interests.”
The  author  takes  a  look  at  corrupt  people  (Who  are  they?  To  what  level  of  the
hierarchy do they belong?), at the funds in question (What are the amounts involved?
Are they related to the commercialisation of services?), andat the structural elements
that  make  possible  and  indeed  encourage  these  practices.  Forming  part  of  the
literature that is dedicated to the transition of former communist countries and seeks
to find out if corruption is the price to be paid for the switch to a market economy, Yan
Sun  studies  how  the  reforms  (and  the  change  to  a  market  economy)  have  made
corruption possible, but also how, in return, corruption has influenced the reforms. She
shows how and why liberalisation has been accompanied by corruption and what the
consequences of that are.
3 The research and analysis are based on an important body of Chinese sources, a dozen
casebooks  that  compile  corruption  cases,  published  between  1989  and  2003  by  the
disciplinary committees (both local and central in Beijing ) of the Communist Party,
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and judicial  editions.  These  volumes  describe  the  corrupt  practices  that  have  been
punished by the Chinese judicial system throughout the country; they deal with both
the local and central apparatus of the party and of the state, both those responsible for
state-owned enterprises and the executives of private companies. The presentation is
built up on systematic comparisons. Yan Sun analyses the dynamics of corruption in
the  different  contexts  of  the  reform  process.  In  terms  of  the  timeframe,  she
distinguishes the years 1978-1992, when planning remained important, from the period
that followed, after Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour, which marks the definitive erosion
of the command economy in favour of the market. Before 1992, corruption is of less
importance; the sums at stake are smaller and the cadres involved are located at a
lower administrative level. In terms of geography, Yan Sun compares the rich coastal
provinces with the poorer inland provinces. The analysis confirms that liberalisation
and  the  reforms  facilitate  corruption.  The  author  similarly  distinguishes  between
corruption that gives rise to a reciprocal exchange of goods or services (“transaction
corruption ”) and corruption where the goods or services move in a single direction
(embezzlement of funds, fraudulent appropriation, etc.). Finally, Yan Sun compares the
case of China with that of Russia . If in China the state has not fallen into the hands of a
mafia, she explains, it is because it is not as weakened as its Russian counterpart was. In
the Chinese case, the party and state cadres were able to take advantage of the reforms;
in Russia ’s case, the absence of opportunities of this type led officials to oppose reform.
Certainly, the capacity of the Chinese state to control its agents under the effects of
decentralisation  and  of  the  transformation  of  its  functions  has  diminished,  but  it
remains powerful in its institutional (continuity of the regime) and political (autonomy
of the political elite) dimensions. Furthermore, when the command economy was split
open  in  China  ,  dynamic  non-state  economic  actors  (the  village  and  township
enterprises) took up the baton, while in Russia the vacuum left by the retreat of the
state was filled by a new oligarchy and organised crime.
4 The presentation is  methodical,  relying on accounts of  both well-known corruption
cases (such as Chen Xitong, the mayor of Beijing dismissed in 1995, and Lai Changxing,
the head of the Yuanhua Group in Xiamen , who became China ’s most wanted man in
the  autumn  of  1999)  and  those  less  well  known,  which  reveal  the  reality  of  the
dynamics and of the mechanisms in play in a variety of contexts. What will be noted
from the work’s conclusions is that corruption is largely a product of the post-Mao
reforms,  made  possible  by  the  opportunities  born  from  a  progressive  change  to  a
market economy (“dual track” price system, new regulations, reform of state-owned
enterprises,  etc.);  the  gradual  retreat  of  the  state  subsequently  increased  the
opportunities for corruption. Corruption is thus, according to Yan Sun, extensively a
consequence  of  the  economic  reforms1.  Secondly,  with  regard  to  the  effects  of
corruption on the reforms, the author highlights a clear difference between the two
periods before and after 1992. During the first period, corruption helped facilitate the
reforms and played a positive role in accelerating the dismantling of the command
economy.  After  1992,  corruption  created  major  obstacles  to  the  deepening  of  the
reforms. In other words, contrary to what a certain neo-liberal theory maintains, the
growing liberalisation of the economy is accompanied by growth in corruption.
5 It is perhaps regrettable that the author has not taken the trouble to set the corrupt
practices in China under reform against the yardstick of Chinese history and thus put
them into greater per- spective or give more weight to their disclosure. Is it not also
the case that corruption is now exposed and denounced more in the press? That is
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worth  explaining.  Finally,  forward-looking  reflection  is  undoubtedly  lacking.  But  it
remains the case that this is a methodical and rigorous work that is useful thanks to its
ambition to be exhaustive.
6 For his part, Ning Wang takes a look at the conditions under which a particular region
changed to specialised production as a result of the reforms. His brief work (145 pages)
constitutes a monograph on the region around Changhu Lake (30 km long and 18 km
wide) to the south of Hubei , the author’s own place of origin. He studies the process by
which the transition to a market economy has transformed this portion of the Chinese
countryside in a micro-analysis of based on 30 or so interviews with peasants and local
heads conducted in 1997 and 1998.
7 The southern part of  Hubei in the vicinity of  Jingzhou is  a region of natural  lakes,
rivers, and canals. Before 1978, the peasants fished strictly for subsistence purposes.
Only a single state farm, set up on the banks of Changhu Lake , was dedicated to this
activity in a professional fashion that qualified it as a fish “producer.” The introduction
of contracts under the household responsibility system at the end of the 1970s did not
initiate any genuine rupture, as the peasants were still not free to choose their own
means of production, which they carried out on land acquired under lease. When the
peasants were authorised to convert their agricultural lands into fish farms, they did it
on a massive scale to supply the urban markets that were developing rapidly. It was
only then that fish production became their principal activity, no longer on Changhu
Lake ,  but within the framework of farms,  the majority of  which were operated by
several households affiliated in partnerships.  Thanks to the reforms, the capture of
fish,  a  marginal  activity  for  subsistence  purposes,  became  the  area’s  dominant
productive  activity  with  commercial  aims  and  oriented  on  supplying  the  Jingzhou
market.
8 Ning Wang’s goal is to study how, within an agricultural framework, a market economy
became  established.  To  do  this,  he  mobilises  the  acquired  knowledge  of  neo-
institutionalist  economics  (the  work  moreover  features  a  preface  by  one  of  this
branch’s principal figures, Ronald Coase, Nobel laureate for economics in 1991). He is
interested in the institutions, understood as the whole body of rules and standards that
provide the framework for and regulate economic behaviour, or, to put it another way,
the rules of the game of pisciculture. The author thus directs his attention at three
institutions. He first asks questions about the conditions under which there emerged
markets (for fish), non-existent in the decades in the 1970s and 1980s. He then brings
his thoughts to bear on the consequences of the new individual property rights. Finally,
he looks at the fish farms considered as productive organisations.
9 On this Chinese terrain, Ning Wang seeks to confirm some of the conclusions of neo-
institutionalist  economics.  Thus  the  emergence  of  a  hierarchy  of  markets  –  small
wholesale markets close to the producers, medium-sized markets and, at the top, the
main market in Jingzhou – is accompanied by the development of an intermediation
activity, the raison d’être of which is to minimise the transaction costs for producers
and consumers, something that confirms Ronald Coase’s definition of markets. Ning
Wang notes that if the development of the commercial activity, once the prohibitions
had  been  lifted,  was  somewhat  spontaneous,  the  definition  of  property  rights  still
requires state intervention. But he also shows that this in itself is not sufficient. The
consolidation  of  the  new  system  of  rights  has  only  been  made  possible  by  the
transformation of social norms; the observance of new formal rules thus depends on
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the  transformation  of  uses  and  associated  values.  In  particular,  the  peasants  only
respected the  property  rights  of  the  state  farm over  the  fish  farming resources  of
Changhu  Lake  the  day  that  they  themselves  became  proprietors  of  fish  farms.
Considered until  then as  customary and normal,  individual  (and illegal)  fishing has
since that time been an activity that is socially disapproved of and condemned. Ning
Wang underlines here the ideological dimension of the social change: it is not enough
to  transform  the  institutions;  even  more  necessary  is  the  social  actors’  evolving
perception of their interests. New legal norms are only observed from the time that
social norms are transformed.
10 On the question of  property rights,  the transition in China is  often associated with
privatisation. But Ning Wang shows that not only have the collective forms of property
not been weakened, they have actually been reinforced. Thanks to the reforms, the
state farm operating on Changhu Lake has seen its interests consolidated. What’s more,
fish farms operated by individuals are rare. Because the management of a farm requires
a  large  workforce,  and  economies  of  scale  make  a  large  farm more  profitable,  the
majority of the farms bring together several families in a partnership.2 The preferred
style of organisation is thus an association of individuals in new collective forms.
11 One  drawback  in  this  work  may  be  the  sometimes  inadequate  linkage  between
theoretical developments and the actual Chinese terrain, a shortcoming of numerous
publications produced from Anglo-Saxon doctoral theses; its major interest lies in its
narrative  and monographic  dimension and in  the  restoration of  the  strategies  and
points  of  view of  the actors  (in particular  pp.  72 to  92).  In the chapter devoted to
property rights, Ning Wang relates in particular the conflicts between the collective
enterprise  operating  on  Changhu  Lake  and  the  individual  fishermen  (before  the
establishment  of  fish  farms  and  while  commercial  demand  was  growing).  The
intensification  of  the  fishing  carried  out  on  an  individual  basis  culminated  in  the
virtual  disappearance  of  the  fish  stock.  When  the  state  farm  tried  to  enforce
observance of  its  legal  rights in the face of  the “wild” (because illegal)  fishing,  the
confrontations  became  violent.  To  protect  their  material  interests  and  resist  the
application of the law, the peasants organised themselves into “illegal fishing gangs”
( dixia buyu dui). There was thus a sharpening of the conflict between the legal state
property rights and existing social norms. Appeasement arrived with the development
of the fish farms and the decline of fishing by individuals in the lake. Once the peasants
themselves became proprietors,  they became concerned about their own rights and
respected  those  of  the  state  farm.  To  understand  the  conditions  leading  to  the
emergence of a market economy, it is thus not sufficient to pay attention only to the
reforms set in motion by the state; it is also necessary, as these two works usefully
remind us, to take a look at the modalities under which the social actors take on the
new arrangements or resist them.
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NOTES
1. Yan Sun thus disputes the validity of the arguments of those such as Lü Xiaobo (
Cadre and Corruption: The Institutional Involution of the Chinese Communist Party,
Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2000) who associate corruption with the legacy of
the Maoist political system.
2. See on a similar subject: Susanne Brandtstädter, “Money Plucked from the Sky:
Shrimp Farming, Entrepreneurship and the Circulation of Know-How in a Fujian
Village" , Taiwan Journal of Anthropology, 2 (1), 2004, p. 41-67. Susanne Brandtstädter
takes a look at the emergence of rural entrepreneurs and places the emphasis on the
distribution of know-how within the village community.
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